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Abstract: Behrendt & Young (B&Y) suggest that hallucinations occur as
a result of decoupling of neuronal populations from sensory control. I pro-
pose that such a decoupling is in fact a constant feature of brain activity,
even under nonpathological conditions. This position is justified by evi-
dence from recent neurophysiological recording studies. I suggest that
hallucinations arise because of a breakdown in segregation of internally
and externally generated activity in a neuronal population.
The core of Behrendt & Young’s (B&Y’s) thesis is that, during hal-
lucinations, neuronal activity in sensory cortex “decouples” from
afferent input – rather than reflecting the structure of the outside
world, sensory neurons take on a life of their own, forming activ-
ity patterns only partially influenced by ongoing sensory stimula-
tion. This is an intriguing explanation for the phenomenon of hal-
lucinations. The aim of this commentary is to suggest that such a
decoupling may in fact be a constant feature of brain function, in-
cluding during nonpathological conditions. The following discus-
sion will describe recent neurophysiological experiments that sup-
port this position.
The idea of a decoupling of neural activity from strict sensory
control goes at least as far back as the “cell assembly” hypothesis
of Hebb (1949). The cell assembly is defined as a subset of neu-
rons among which excitatory connections have been strengthened
by repeated coactivation, allowing the assembly to later maintain
its activity through reverberant mutual excitation. A cell assembly
may be activated by sensory stimulation, or it may also fire as a re-
sult of purely internal factors, such as the prior activity of another
assembly. The resulting “phase sequence” of active assemblies was
Hebb’s model for volitional cognitive activity (the “train of
thought”). In contrast to contemporaneous “feed-forward” theo-
ries of brain function, which concentrate on the production of sim-
ple stimulus–response associations, Hebb’s theory also allows for
behavior resulting purely from internal activity, whereby the
phase sequence of active assemblies, decoupled from sensory con-
trol, lead eventually to the production of motion.
Although this theory has had a profound effect on thinking
about the brain over the last half century, it has only recently be-
come possible to test it directly at the spike-train level. The spike
trains of neurons in sensory systems are certainly correlated with
the structure of sensory input. However, repeated presentations
of identical stimuli lead to varying responses across repetitions
(Britten et al. 1993; Mazurek & Shadlen 2002; Shadlen & New-
some 1998; Softky & Koch 1993; Stevens & Zador 1998). This vari-
ability may simply be noise (Shadlen & Newsome 1994; 1998; Zo-
hary et al. 1994), or it may reflect an essential element of brain
function. Indeed, any division into “signal” and “noise” itself rests
on assumptions. The “signal” is typically defined to be the stimu-
lus presented by the experimenter, and the “noise” to be any fur-
ther variability, assumed random and not helpful for information
processing. Alternatively, the variability may also represent a “sig-
nal,” just not one under experimental control. In particular, vari-
ability may reflect participation of neuronal assemblies in cogni-
tive processes not directly related to the stimulus presented by the
experimenter.
How might this possibility be tested experimentally? If a corti-
cal region is involved in suprasensory processing, it should happen
not only in a single cell, but also at the level of the whole popula-
tion. To distinguish the involvement of neuronal assemblies in
processing nonsensory information from stochastic noise, there-
fore, requires the recording and analysis of large cell populations,
where suprasensory processing will be reflected by coordination
of spike trains beyond that predicted by common stimulus modu-
lation.
Recordings from neuronal pairs have revealed that coincident
spikes occur frequently in a wide variety of systems. Two types of
pairwise synchronization are commonly seen, with characteristic
time scales of ~1 msec (Constantinidis et al. 2001; Csicsvari et al.
1998; Usrey & Reid 1999) and ~25 msec (Bair et al. 2001; Con-
stantinidis et al. 2001; DeCharms & Merzenich 1996). It has been
hypothesized that 1-msec scale synchronization reflects monosy-
naptic drive between neurons (Csicsvari et al. 1998; Marshall et
al. 2002) or common monosynaptic input from a third cell (Usrey
& Reid 1999), whereas 25-msec scale synchrony results from more
general network coordination (Constantinidis et al. 2001).
What role might this 25-msec synchrony play in neural pro-
cessing? In a recent study (Harris et al. 2003), we investigated the
hypothesis that this coordination reflects an organization into as-
semblies whose activity can reflect both external sensory input and
internal cognitive processes. One signature of the assembly orga-
nization is the existence of anatomically distributed groups of neu-
rons, whose activity is synchronized more than predicted by com-
mon sensory modulation. A second postulated signature is that,
although individual neurons may participate in many assemblies,
not every possible combination of cells comprises a cell assembly.
The latter feature should be reflected by a statistical preference
in the probability with which a neuron joins its various peers in
synchronous firing. A novel “peer prediction method” was used to
show that precisely such an organization exists in the hippocam-
pus of rats exploring a spatial environment. Neurons are organized
into assemblies, whose timing and composition could not be pre-
dicted simply from the animal’s trajectory through space (Harris
et al. 2003). Furthermore, the time scale of this assembly organi-
zation could also be estimated, and was found to be 10–30 msec.
This time scale may be of particular physiological significance. Be-
cause it closely matches the membrane time constant of pyrami-
dal neurons in the hippocampal region, activity synchronized with
this time scale may be optimal for inducing spiking in downstream
neurons. Furthermore, this time scale matches the period of the
hippocampal gamma oscillation and the effective window for
synaptic plasticity. We therefore suggest that assembly activity
may be optimal for propagation and storage of information in neu-
ronal circuits.
These results suggest an extension of B&Y’s hypothesis. That is,
even under nonpathological conditions, neuronal assemblies are
equally involved in internal cognitive processes, such as mental
imagery, as in the representation of the external world. The ques-
tion is then: How does the healthy brain keep the internally gen-
erated and external worlds separate? When a neuron fires a spike,
how do postsynaptic cells know whether that spike coded for an
external sensory event or an internally generated one? This task
may be harder than we imagine, and the breakdown of this bal-
ancing act may be the cause of hallucinations.
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